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Abstract
The article explores how categories of deserving and undeserving groups are established in policy designs and how social
target groups are constructed according to such distinctions. Institutionalised systems of exclusion and inclusion have a
profound impact on citizenship and substantial democracy. Neoliberalist political ideas and attitudes have strengthened
the focus on deserving and undeserving groups over the last years and spurred a popular belief that welfare fraud is ram-
pant. This tendency has led to a retrenchment of established rights and increasing use of illiberal means to further punish
the undeserving. This article discusses these issues further by looking at the position of lone mothers in Denmark and
how they constitute a social target group defined by their class, gender, ethnic, and religious differences. Categories of
deservingness are also framed in national narratives and politics of belonging.
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1. Introduction
Welfare institutions and the general public have over the
last centuries distinguished between those who deserve
assistance and those who do not (Gans, 1995). The cat-
egories of deserving groups and criteria needed to de-
fine these are always situated in a political context. Fem-
inist scholars have identified intersections between na-
tionalism, gender, andwelfare (Siim& Stoltz, 2013; Yuval-
Davis, 2011). Migration scholars claim that immigrants
as a group have become ‘the new undeserving poor’ in
the European welfare states (Bommes & Geddes, 2000;
Jørgensen & Thomsen, 2018; van Oorschot, 2006). Cat-
egories of deservingness are constructed through policy
target groups. Schneider and Ingram (1997) have drawn
particular attention to the instrumental and symbolic
messages that policy target group constructions convey.
The argument of Ingram and Schneider is that the so-
cial construction of target groups which carry negative
messages will undermine the quality of effective democ-
racy. Such policy designs can discourage active citizen-
ship: ‘Policies impact citizenship because they can en-
courage and facilitate participation for some, but discour-
age or exclude participation by others’ (Schneider & In-
gram, 2005, p. 27).
This article is interested in the ‘others’ in this state-
ment. The article investigates how categories of deserv-
ing and undeserving groups are established in policy de-
signs of entitlements for single providers. The article fo-
cuses especially on single mothers as a specific target
group and analyses what position this target group has
in the welfare system, how this is legitimized, and which
policy tools are used in the management of this target
group as well as the possible implications for citizenship
and democracy. The article focuses on Denmark, espe-
cially the years 2010–2013, when single mothers were
heavily debated in the media corresponding with the de-
velopment and increased mandate of municipal control
mechanisms. Single mothers are an illustrative group for
understanding the restructuring of the welfare state and
the shift in the categories of deserving and undeserving.
Especially the changing emphasis on control in the ne-
oliberal restructuring of the economy and institutions for
understanding changes in social welfare policies target-
ing single providers. Furthermore, it is argued that sin-
gle mothers are a diverse group in which intersections
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between gender, ethnicity, and class influence the con-
struction of the specific target groups, policy messages,
and tools. Issues of equality and welfare are therefore
influenced by the particular intersections of a variety
of categories.
The argument is not that single mothers are the only
disadvantaged or persecuted group (the unemployed for
instance have faced similar cut-backs in rights and ser-
vices and have likewise been targets for increased con-
trol) but the single mothers group makes the restructur-
ing of the welfare state and the deepening of (social) in-
equalities visible and can, therefore, be used to identify
the broader effects which stem from neoliberal restruc-
turing of the welfare state. This article presents the ar-
gument that people´s belief that social fraud is rampant,
despite the lack of empirical evidence, has led to the de-
velopment of policy design emphasising control and sanc-
tions. Policy target groups are constructed as weak and
dependent, which itself legitimizes the policy designs. So-
cial benefits available to single mothers have been sub-
ject to much attention from municipalities, politicians at
parliamentary level, and the media. One explanation is
that they are overrepresented among recipients of social
benefits. Another explanation is that municipalities have
focused mostly on developing controlling policies in ar-
eas where they have the greatest economic incentive in
revealing social fraud. This would include additional ben-
efits to single providers but not, for instance, public pen-
sions which are financed solely through the state (Social-
og Integrationsministeriet, 2011). Yet, there is a belief
among the municipalities that single providers and espe-
cially single mothers are the welfare area most prone to
social fraud, although this is based on convictions and es-
timates rather than facts (KMD, 2011). My argument is
that the policy designs following from these convictions
are detrimental to equality and democracy. The article
ends with an analysis claiming that the policy framework
is biased against ethnic and religious minorities. The pol-
icy tools developed, and the underlying rationales sup-
porting these, cannot only beexplained as a ‘fight’ against
social fraud but show how categories are intersected and
the tools are ‘culturalised’ to deal with social problems
believed to characterize ethnic minority mothers.
2. Data and Design
The empirical material, i.e., what constitutes the poli-
cies, encompasses legislative texts, rules and regulations
and action plans about the issue on the national level, is
supplemented by rules, regulations, and implementation
guidelines at the municipal level. This also includes the
guidelines for the so-called control units/groups working
at the municipal level. Moreover, the empirical material
includes reports and surveys conducted on social fraud,
in general, to assess how, if at all, single providers are
discussed in this material.
This data is supplemented by decisions (until end-
2017)made by the National Social Appeals Board (NSAB).
All principle decisions taken by the Board pertaining to
single providers over the last 20 years were collected.
Out of 37 decisions, 13 dealt specificallywith singlemoth-
ers. Ten of these decisions revoked the municipal deci-
sion to terminate social benefits. The inclusion of mate-
rial fromNSAB is important as it has been decisive for the
policy development and represents a type of material
which is often overlooked (see Chunn & Gavigan, 2004,
and Crookshanks, 2012, for comparable approaches).
In the analysis, the focus is mainly on the national
framework. The national framework is interpreted and
implemented differently by the municipalities which in
many cases have beenmore restrictive than the national
framework. I, therefore, include different examples from
the Danish municipalities. To make the argument that
the target group constructions can only be analysed
properly using an intersectional perspective a number
of cases have been which were taken up by the me-
dia. The article draws on Yuval-Davis’ and Leslie McCall’s
approaches on intersectionalism (McCall, 2005; Yuval-
Davis, 2006). Both make a distinction between intra-
categorical and inter-categorical complexities. In prac-
tice, this implies taking categories of difference into the
analysis to document relationships of inequality among
social groups (McCall, 2005). Consequently, it is the re-
lationships between categories which are of interest
and how these particular relationships position the tar-
get group in the policy framework. Employing an in-
tersectional perspective makes it possible to identify
the ‘neglected’ groups—those “whose identity crosses
the boundaries of traditionally constructed groups” (Dill,
2002, p. 5). In the present article, this, for instance, leads
to the focus on single mothers with an ethnic and reli-
giousminority backgroundwhich turns out to be decisive
for their position in the target group constructions.
3. Redistribution, Policy Designs, Neoliberalism and
Citizenship
Welfare states are based on criteria regarding who is en-
titled to what. Likewise, there is a strong emphasis on
citizens’ duties and obligations. The literature on redis-
tribution points to different principles for welfare dis-
tribution, e.g., merit, need, and equality. However, re-
distribution also is dependent on citizenship and iden-
tity (Korpi, 2003). Van Oorschot points to additional cri-
teria for deservingness (2006). Besides need and merit,
he points to control (the level of control over neediness,
i.e., those with less control are more deserving), iden-
tity (the closer to us/the in-group, the more deserving),
and attitude (the more grateful and compliant, the more
deserving). Following these criteria, studies have shown
that the unemployed are perceived as having less charac-
ter, being less responsible and less trustworthy. Elderly
people are generally perceived as most deserving, fol-
lowed by sick or disabled people, while the unemployed
are regarded as less deserving, with immigrants being
the least deserving group (Jørgensen & Thomsen, 2016,
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 3, Pages 170–179 171
2018). Policy target groups are not static entities butmay
change over time and context. The category of single
mothers/solo-support mothers has historically changed
from being one of the ‘most’ deserving groups to being
depicted as undeserving (Chunn & Gavigan, 2004; Crook-
shanks, 2012). Deserving groups always face the risk of
falling into the undeserving category. Due to an underly-
ing assumption that the welfare states are challenged by
people and groups who might be dependent but not de-
serving, governments have developed policies sanction-
ing and punishing the groups believed to be a burden.
This is an understanding conveying a liberal-paternalist
message which has become a key element of neoliberal-
ism. That society is liberal and free at the top but restric-
tive, paternalist, and authoritarian at the bottom, to use
Wacquant’s way of putting it (2009, p. 8). The flipside of
this is a growing insecurity and new bases for exclusion
creating new forms of marginalisation. Within this politi-
cal logic, emphasising individual responsibility is hence a
necessary tool for revitalising welfare societies. Labour
market participation is not the only marker for distin-
guishing between the entitled and un-entitled.
4. Degenerative Policy Designs
Schneider and Ingram have offered a conceptual frame-
work for understanding degenerative policy designs and
analyse target group constructions. Public policies are
the primary tool through which governments and policy-
makers inscribe, exploit, entrench, perpetuate or change
such social constructions (Schneider & Ingram, 2005,
p. 5). Advantaged target populations have significant po-
litical power resources, enjoy positive social construc-
tions, and are characterised as being deserving. Depen-
dents are groups with less political power resources but
are still constructed as deserving in a moral sense in
spite of being regarded as helpless and in need of cor-
rection and discipline. Contenders have resources that
compare to those of advantaged groups but are not re-
garded as deserving. Deviants constitute weak and pow-
erless groups who are negatively constructed as unde-
serving and of no value for society. Burdens are oversub-
scribed and benefits undersubscribed for the undeserv-
ing groups and vice versa for the deserving groups. Differ-
ential treatment in welfare policies may reflect different
considerations. These constructs also characterise how
policies are implemented andwithwhat kind ofmessage.
5. The Danish Welfare State
The Danish welfare state has the characteristics of a so-
cial democratic/Scandinavian welfare state model with a
high level of tax-based re-distribution organised by the
state. Re-distribution targets all citizens. The principle of
universalism gained stronghold with the Pension Reform
of 1956, which was later followed by universality in rela-
tion to social policies as social security, health, and ed-
ucation. Universalism aims at reducing social inequality,
and although this aim has been challenged and trans-
formed, decades later this goal of creating equal oppor-
tunities for all is perceived as instrumental for maintain-
ing a socially coherent welfare society (Kristensen, 2007).
As Kristensen argues although the universal welfare prin-
ciples, such as the principle of universalism, are often
based on an incomplete understanding of the citizen, in
Denmark women are in general terms included in the
notion of the implicit Danish citizen (Kristensen, 2007,
p. 57). The ideal citizen can thus be said to be a work-
ing, able-bodied family member. The model presumes a
high employment-rate, which succeeding governments
have tried to foster through an active labour market pol-
icy. Migrants, therefore, become a test for the limits and
sustainability of the welfare state if they face difficulties
in entering the labour market.
6. Single Mothers: Strong, Deprived or Deviant?
In the following, focus will be on the construction of a
particular target group: single mothers. The present ar-
ticle places itself within studies exploring problem rep-
resentations and the role of public policy in relation to
single mothers (Dwyer, 2004). These studies argue that
individuals’ choices are shaped and defined through po-
litical discourses based on individualisation, paternalism,
and neoliberalism formulated through welfare-to-work
programs and moral correctives (Gazso, 2009). Dwyer ar-
gues that ‘rights are conditional on the acceptance of
individual responsibilities’ (2004, p. 282). Individual re-
sponsibilities are market responsibilities, hence the role
as an informal caregiver is basically considered without
value if a person claims social benefits (Gazso, 2009,
p. 12). These studies argue that single mothers have
gone from being dependent (and rightfully deserving)
and/or deprived to now being deviant (Chunn & Gavi-
gan, 2004; Crookshanks, 2012; Mokhtar & Platt, 2009;
Swan, Shaw, Cullity, Hapern, & Humphrey, 2008). Most
empirical studies, also comparative studies, stem from
the English-speaking countries, especially the US and UK,
so how do these findings resonate in a Danish context?
The Danish welfare state model has been described as
women-friendly and not leading to themarginalisation of
singlemothers (Siim, 1999). In a Danish context, research
has rejected that single mothers are represented as a so-
cietal problem (Siim, 1999; Stoltz, 1997). Siim argues that
‘lonemothers have not been singled out as an ideological
problem or as a political issue’ (1999, p. 3). On the con-
trary, they are framed in a cultural image as being ‘strong
and autonomous group’ (Siim, 1999, p. 142). These de-
scriptions seem valid for their time but at the same time,
this article will argue that single mothers have indeed
been problematized in recent years as a consequence of
the deepening andembedment of the neoliberal political
rationale and the subsequent restructuring of the econ-
omy, institutions and policy logics. This is especially vis-
ible when the target group of single mothers intersects
with categories of ethnicity and religion.
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As studies on intersectionalism have shown, the in-
tersection of different categories construct different po-
sitions in society (Crenshaw, 1989; McCall, 2005; Yuval-
Davis, 2011). Gazco, for instance, shows that non-white
single mothers in both Canada and Britain are likely to be
poorer than others (Gazso, 2009). Labourmarket segrega-
tion is affected by both gender and race/ethnicity. The im-
age of the black welfare has a very long history from the
‘lazy promiscuous Jezebel’ figure from the past to the US
food-stamp moms of today. These images are very per-
sistent; even today images of black mothers evoke hos-
tile attitudes to welfare support (Gustafson, 2011; Pulk-
ingham, Fuller, & Kershaw, 2010). Although race as a cate-
gory is less prominent in Denmark than in the US (and the
UK) the same dynamics are nevertheless present (Albrekt
Larsen & Dejgaard, 2012). Ethnic minority background is
decisive for public attitudes and eventually target group
constructions. Racialisation of single mothers, however,
is a dimension which has been given little research at-
tention as most focus has been on gender (Mokhtar &
Platt, 2009). Adding a racial/ethnic dimension to the tar-
get group constructs makes it possible to show how char-
acteristics are explicated. It shows how societal norms
and expectations for behaviour are not colour-blind. If in-
deed the Danish welfare state model is gender neutral it
is not neutral in terms of policy tools and rationales.
7. Single Mothers in Denmark: Some Facts
The number of single parents has been rather stable over
the last 25 years. In 1992 there were 138,068 persons
registered as single parents out of a total of 754,682 fam-
ilies with children. Single here refers to all lone parents
(i.e., divorced/separated, as well as single parenthood by
choice).1 116,388 of the single parents were single moth-
ers. By 2017 the number increased to 115,627 single
mothers and 13,912 single fathers amounting to almost
22%of all families (Danmarks Statistik, 2018). The Danish
welfare model (alongside the other Scandinavian coun-
tries) is often described as being women-friendly due to
its high level of universalism and individualisation (Siim,
1999; Siim& Stoltz, 2013). These numbers do not say any-
thing about the single parents’ position in society. A 2004
study of social exclusion in Denmark concluded that “sin-
gle mothers are one of the most disadvantaged groups
in the Danish society” (Larsen, 2004, p. 20). The most
recent study on single mothers offers different conclu-
sions: almost 20% of all single mothers are on social be-
fits (CASA, 2013). Not all singlemothers aremarginalised
of course (in terms of socio-economic position) but the
report identifies those who are (in 2009 14%) as being:
young, having ethnic minority backgrounds (in 2009 14%
of all single mothers), not having vocational training, be-
ing outside the labour force, unemployed, within educa-
tion and/or receiving social benefits.
8. Target Groups: ‘Genuine Singles’ as a Target Group
In Denmark, single parents are entitled to social benefits
(ordinary and extra children support, housing support,
and residual/free place in daycare institutions) to meet
their additional expenses. If the other parent not having
the child living with him/her is not able to pay the stip-
ulated contribution, an additional support (special child
support) is available. It is a universal benefit available to
all who meet the criteria, criteria which do not include
means-testing. The key criterion for both types of spe-
cial benefit is whether or not the applicant is ‘genuinely
single’ (reelt enlig). This status according to the law has
to be confirmed annually, although many municipalities
require that the applicant sends in a form every month
notifying them of any change in personal relations or in-
come. The rules stipulating eligibility for social benefits
as a single parent are in theory quite simple. If one parent
has the custody of the child, and thereby most financial
burdens, he/she is eligible for extra support.
In practice, the concept of “genuine single” is very
hard to define and the criteria are indeterminate mak-
ing it difficult for the municipalities to assess whether a
person is single or not (Den Social Retshjælp, 2013; KL,
2008a; Social- og Integrationsministeriet, 2012). In real-
ity, there are no fixed guidelines. It is not specified ex-
plicitly anywhere how long time a client can spend to-
gether with an ex-partner and still be considered single
and entitled to extra benefits. The administrative prac-
tices are described in a handbook by Local Government
Denmark which is meant to assist the municipalities (KL,
2008b). In practice, the guidelines are stipulated legally
following three cases dealt with by the NSAB in 1999.
The decision and the dissemination of this are crucial, as
it states that ‘that there should not be proper evidence
that there is a marital-like relationship’ in order to termi-
nate the social assistance and demand that assistance is
paid back (Den Sociale Ankestyrelse, 1999, p. 1). Conse-
quently, the municipalities have only to render it proba-
ble that a person is claiming benefits that he/she is not
entitled to. Due to insecurity and confusion—and most
likely the later decisions from the NSAB—the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Integration published in July 2013
a pamphlet informing single providers about their rights
and more explicitly what they cannot do (Social- og Inte-
grationsministeriet, 2013).
9. The Rationale for a Restrictive Turn
The problem with these targeted social benefits is that
they go hand in hand with distrust and increased con-
trol. Distrust is institutionalised and implemented in var-
ious control systems as the municipal control units are
granted substantial power to pursue their task and ulti-
mately legitimise the distrust itself. This assumption that
1 The current debate on Single Mothers by Choice (SMC) or choice mothers is of a different nature and less relevant for this analysis, although the felt
stigmatization of being a single mother may be more or less the same. The difference is that the SMC’s are often resourceful and not unemployed nor
are they accused of social fraud and hence do not fit into the target populations constructed by the public policies I am looking at.
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social fraud is increasing is the basis of many of the re-
cent changes and policy actions which have been under-
taken in recent years. There is no empirical evidence for
either the proportion of social fraud itself or evidence in-
dicating that it is growing. In the guidelines from 2008,
Local Government Denmark writes that ‘although we at
the moment do not know if there is a real increase in
the number of social fraud cases, more municipalities
believe that there is more organised social fraud’ (KL,
2008b, p. 41). This is in line with Gustafson’s findings
from a US context (Gustafson, 2011). A report from a
‘transversal ministerial committee on better control’ con-
cluded that there is no information about nor valid esti-
mates of the total abuse of social benefits but estimates
suggest 91 municipalities made claims for back payment
amounting to €6.7 million (Tværministerielt udvalg om
bedre control, 2010, p. 17). The total amount spent on so-
cial benefits in Denmark was approximately €32 billion in
2010 (SFI, 2011, p. 7). In comparison, the committee es-
timates the value of moonlighting to amount to €2,8 bil-
lion (SFI, 2011, p. 25). Yet, the proposal of the committee
is to increase the control of social fraud especially target-
ing genuine singles in particular. Similarly, the newspa-
pers are full of stories of potential gains for themunicipal-
ities in uncovering social fraud (e.g., DR1, 2013; TV2 Øst,
2010). These stories have the single mother at the cen-
tre and most complaints municipalities receive deal with
single mothers. In a report on the municipal decisions
to terminate social benefits to single parents, the State
Administration found that 49% of the decisions were di-
rectly wrong and later revoked, that in 26% of the cases
the basis for the decision was weakly documented, and
not documented at all in 23% of the cases (Statsforvalt-
ningen Sjælland, 2011, p. 2).
Nevertheless, the overall message repeated by state
authorities is of social fraud being a growing phe-
nomenon and that increased control is the solution. Es-
pecially the category of genuine singles, i.e., single par-
ents is identified as a target group. As the gender distri-
butionmentioned above shows it is, in reality, a construc-
tion of single mothers. In 2008, the municipalities were
requested to introduce more control and strengthen the
effort against social fraud by the now abolished Min-
istry of Welfare (Ministerialtidende, 2009). The same
message was repeated in 2011 with a new political
agreement on strengthened efforts against social fraud
(Regeringen, 2011). The logic of the agreement is that
more people are taking advantage of the system under-
mining the social trust upon which the welfare state is
built. Yet, there are no data supporting that there ismore
social fraud, that despite an extreme growth in anony-
mous tip-offs, or any evidence to support the claim that
single mothers cheat more than others.
10. Tools and Rules: Controlling Policies in Practice
All municipalities are obliged to establish so-called con-
trol teams as well as the ability for citizens to submit sus-
picions and accusations of social fraud anonymously. To-
day, 97% of all municipalities have control units (KMD,
2011). These are used to gather data used in the cases
against individual clients. The tools used by these con-
trol units could bemonitoring a client’s house to seewho
visits and how frequently, to see if shoes belonging to a
man are left outside the door during the night, if anyone
borrows the car, or to investigate transactions and trans-
fers in a bank account. In some cases, the control unit
monitored Facebook profiles and even created false pro-
files to be able to interact with a given target and keep
track of updates regarding their social life (Gaardmand,
2011a; Gaardmand & Gjerding, 2011). This is an extreme
case of surveillance and one which has dubious results.
In 2011, NSAB revoked one such case. Sascha had been
monitored for more than a year and was not informed
about this until 11 months after the investigation was
initiated by the control group. During some periods the
control units passed by her home on a daily basis to ob-
serve (Gaardmand, 2011c). They looked for shoes belong-
ing to a man and scrutinised her Facebook profile. One
of the findings leading to the decision to revoke her so-
cial benefits was on the grounds that she was believed
to live together with her ex-boyfriend and father of her
children because that he had tagged a photo of Sascha
and her sister with the comment ‘nice women’. Most of-
ten these tips come from other citizens and are given
anonymously. 47% of the municipalities answered that
most cases involving social fraud were taken up follow-
ing anonymous tip-offs (KMD, 2011, p. 18). In Aarhus,
the city council employed pensioned police officers to
undertake the control as they ‘knew how to do efficient
surveillance’ (Gaardmand, 2011b). As the municipalities
do not need any hard evidence to make a case but only
render it probable that a client is committing social fraud
all these different types of tools are used to do exactly
that. In this case, the sanctions and burdens are heav-
ily oversubscribed compared to the tools used regarding
other groups, eg control of the working conditions of au-
pairs or the use of tax havens to avoid taxes.
Although the Ministry of Internal Affairs previously
declared that there is no legal basis for making system-
atic observations and that all citizens have to be in-
formed about on-going investigations and the gathering
of information (KL, 2008a), this is exactly what happens
and indeed what the Minister of Employment asks for in
her response referred to above. The municipalities, ac-
cording to the same declaration from the Ministry, em-
ploy the principle of proportionality. Monitoring Face-
book profiles and surveillance techniques such as those
outlined above definitely are out of proportion, but the
means seem to serve the goal as the practices continue.
The citizen has a right to know when a case is made and
investigations are undertaken. Tools such as surveillance
transgress the limits of the contracts and obligations and
are not transparent for the citizen. It is legitimated by
the municipalities through the construction of the target
group of single mothers as one prone to cheating and
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not living up to the obligations and expectations of the
‘good’ citizen. As the citizen has the duty to disclose all
material facts it is vital that citizens have the full informa-
tion about the conditions and criteria but the notion of a
genuine single is characterised by uncertainty and com-
plexity and it is extremely difficult for this target group to
knowwhat their rights are. In somemunicipalities, single
mothers are for instance informed that a boyfriend can
sleep over a couple of times a week but cannot take out
the trash or helpwith buying things (Gaardmand&Gjerd-
ing, 2011). In other cases, the civil servant has told a so-
cial client if she could have sexual intercoursewith her ex-
husband (Gaardmand&Gjerding, 2011). Decisions trans-
gressing the normal level of intimacy expected and toler-
ated from the communication with authorities and con-
veying a strong normative and paternalist message on
how social clients should behave (cf., Chunn & Gavigan,
2004; Crookshanks, 2012). This type of communication
is only possible because the social client is constructed
as a weak potentially undeserving recipient. The over-
subscription of burdens and sanctions brings the system
closer to the criminal system than thewelfare system (cf.,
Gustafson, 2011; Wacquant, 2009).
The municipal decisions on withdrawing social bene-
fit and initiating a case are based on administrative judg-
ment but practice varies immensely between the mu-
nicipalities. Scholars within law state that the evidence
rarely is strong enough for the ordinary system of jus-
tice (Klingsey, Gaardmand, & Gjerding, 2011). As already
emphasised, neither is this necessary as the municipal-
ities only have to render it probable. In other words, it
is up to the discretion of the civil servant at work to de-
cide if a social client should be accused of fraud. The aim
rarely is to get the social client convicted in the criminal
system but ‘simply’ to terminate the payment for unde-
serving groups. Even though the municipalities breach
the law by systematically monitoring a social client, this
carries no consequences for the control unit. Moreover,
the data gathered through illegal means can still be used
in cases against the client. Consequently, the legal pro-
tection characterising a liberal democracy is being under-
mined by illiberal and even illegal means.
The problem is not mentioned in a new agreement
on better control from 2011. Indeed, the focus has been
on creating extended remedies for the control groups,
for instance, by making unannounced visits to a tar-
get’s home. In 2010, control units from 80 municipalities
made a demand for expanded remedies for control to
the Ministry of Employment. In 2013, Udbetaling Dan-
mark, an agency managing social benefit payments took
over the responsibility for social fraud from the state. The
agency can improve the linkage of records which is be-
lieved to increase control and uncover fraud. The aim is
also to systematize the tools used by the municipalities
who still have responsibility in cases where payments do
not come from Udbetaling Danmark, e.g., social bene-
fits to unemployed, reduced payment for child-care in-
stitutions, etc. The municipalities can still, and are en-
couraged to, use anonymous tip-offs (Social- og Integra-
tionsministeriet, 2011). Although the agency launched a
new 40 person task-force with the sole purpose of help-
ing municipalities uncover social fraud, the control units
demand more powers to use at the local level (KL, 2013).
One such request is to be able to make surprise inspec-
tions, a tool currently only used by the police.
The policy tools are connected to social target groups.
Single mothers have been a primary target group in the
municipalities’ endeavours to stop social fraud. Single
mothers tipped-off are depicted as having irresponsi-
ble lifestyles, receiving large social benefits, giving birth
to more children than they can support, and generally
not meeting the norms of the middle class (e.g., Gaard-
mand & Gjerding, 2011). Subsequently, they are a de-
viant group and not necessarily dependent, no matter
how weak their position in society.
11. Istahil, Laila, and Laily: Same but Different?
The cases of Istahil, Laila, and Laily illustrate how ethnic-
ity and religion intersect with the construction of a single
provider. Istahil, Laila, and Laily are female Somali sin-
gle providers who ended up accused of social fraud in
their respective municipalities. Returning to the claims
by Siim and Stoltz (2013) that single mothers have not
been problematised, other researchers such as Bente
Rosenbeck and Nina von Hielmcrone—who have both
carried out research into single mothers—see the emer-
gence of a new group of single mothers resembling the
American welfare queen trope (in Gaardmand & Gjerd-
ing, 2011). These stories are picked up from the media
and are not individual analytical cases but examples of
a particular target group construction. Having an ethnic
minority background adds a cultural ‘explanation’ to an
existing problem. This target group primarily lives in so-
called ghettos and thereby reconfirms the government’s
problematisation of these urban areas. Again, there is
no evidence that this group should be more inclined to
social fraud than other single parents but the fact that
ethnic minorities are overrepresented in the total recipi-
ents of social benefit2 not only legitimates harsh actions,
oversubscription of control instruments and punishment,
but at the same time disregards sociological explanations
and structural inequality.
Single ethnic minority mothers tend to be in a partic-
ularly difficult situation as their language skills do not al-
ways allow them to understand their rights. Furthermore,
their cases are not usually taken up in a positive manner
in the media; when, in 2011, the newspaper Information
did a series of articles on single mothers containing accu-
sations of social fraud, none of the other media picked
up the story until Sascha’s previously mentioned case
was described (cf., Section 10). The first three examples
2 According to Albrekt Larsen and Dejgaard (2012) ethnic minorities received 28% of all social benefits in 2008 although constituting less than 10% of
the population.
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were Somali women (Istahil, Laila, and Laily) but Sascha
was a young majority Dane and was invited onto Danish
TV. According to the producer, the Somali women were
not fit for national broadcasting as ‘Muslims are difficult
to propagate’ (Gaardmand & Gjerding, 2011). As Schnei-
der and Ingram argue, not all groups have equal access
to participation and mobilisation (Schneider & Ingram,
2005, p. 21). Having an ethnic minority background—
and in many cases, another religious background—leads
to peculiar, and in fact, degenerative policy designs and
tools.Many singlemothers end up losing their social ben-
efits due to their ex-husband not having volatile housing
conditions, e.g., not having a proper flat, staying in dif-
ferent places, or even being homeless. Often the control
groups and civil servants have used this as evidence to
suggest that the man must be living with the ex-partner.
Somali men, in particular, have difficulties accepting di-
vorces and the loss of authority, and for some it leads to
a rather unstable lifestyle which ends up damaging the
ex-partner without that being the intention (see Nauja
Kleist in Gaardmand, 2011d). Although it ought to be
fairly easy to investigate this, the cases show that de-
spite the women telling the authorities that they are in-
deed living on their own, the women’s own statements
are disregarded, and they lose their entitlements (Gaard-
mand & Gjerding, 2011). In some cases, it is almost ab-
surd such as in the case of Laila where her ex-husband
lived in Ukraine and yet the control group decided that
she should lose her social benefits (Gaardmand, 2011d).
The citizen’s advisor in Holbæk municipality stated that
the majority of single mothers experiencing problems re-
sulting from the vaguely defined ‘genuine single’ have
an ethnic minority background (Fasmer, 2011a). Some-
times this leads to the loss of social benefits and in other
cases withdrawal from society to avoid losing their ben-
efits. Holbæk is interesting as it has made decisions on
stopping social benefits and demanding back-payment in
a number of cases targeting Muslim single mothers. The
control unit has here used the statements from an Imam,
regarding difficulties of obtaining a divorce for the fe-
male part according to Sharia, to make the case that the
social client was living in a marital-like relationship (Fas-
mer, 2011b; Gaardmand, 2011d). The statements came
from a meeting that the control group in Odense, a large
Danish municipality, had with a local Imam which then
was spread to other municipalities and was used in train-
ing program for municipal control units. Obviously, these
very general statements could be taken forwhat they are:
anon-recognized religious actor expressing his own reli-
gious beliefs. Sharia-law is neither recognized by Danish
law nor can it be used to build a case against a social
client. Nonetheless, that is exactly what has happened
in different municipalities. The statements by the Imam
have been used to render it probable that Muslim single
mothers were indeed not living on their own, as for in-
stance happened in Laily’s case. The leader of amunicipal
control group argues that although the religious criteria
cannot be used solely as evidence:
We here are dealing with a group of citizens who in
other situations makes claims based on having a spe-
cial religion which demands they are offered affirma-
tive actions” and “if their religion is that important
in other situations then you cannot show up and say
that in this case, my religion does not matter. (Gaard-
mand, 2011d)
Consequently, single Muslim mothers are constructed in
a way as to make it impossible to leave a dysfunctional
marriage and still share some common obligations with
the ex-husband as having any contact would be taken as
a proof of social fraud. NSAB has reversed all cases it has
received based on the Imam’s statement but it can only
do sowith the cases the Board actually receives. Only the
most resourceful women and those assisted by lawyers
and lay representatives know what to do and Muslim
lone mothers are a marginalized group who frequently
have lower language skills, hence the revoked cases may
not change anything unless the practice is changed by
law by the state authorities.
12. Conclusions
Responsiveness to public preferences is considered to
be central for policy-making. As the analysis has shown
it does not follow that responsiveness improves democ-
racy. The public perception that social fraud is rampant
has not been supported empirically. Nevertheless, policy-
makers and politicians have developed policy designs
emphasising control, sanctions, and punishment to over-
come the problem of social fraud. The policy tools and
rules target weak and dependent groups. The case of
the single mothers in Denmark illustrates an example of
degenerative policy design damaging democracy rather
than improving it. The construction of deserving and un-
deserving groups is not a new invention, but a distinc-
tion which can be traced back to the establishment of
the welfare state and social policies. The construction
of single mothers as an undeserving group is a particu-
lar type of construction which also has its own history.
Many of the women described are not aware of possi-
bilities of—or channels for—complaint and end up ac-
cepting municipal decisions. The cases show that the
NSAB have turned around many of the decisions of the
municipality but it can only do so if a case is taken to
the Board. Marginalisation of the women and the fact
that they are not well informed as to their rights is a
democratic problem and a problem for substantive citi-
zenship (Crookshanks, 2012). Municipalities—supported
and encouraged by the government—have created a
framework where social clients, in reality, are guilty un-
til proven otherwise as the municipalities only have to
render it probable that the person in question is commit-
ting social fraud. Paradoxically, the information used in
the cases is gathered illegally but nonetheless can still
be used. If a local administration does not accept the ex-
planation it has the right to terminate funding. The mu-
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nicipalities act as both the executive and judicial power
in this matter. In all other situations and dealings with
the authorities, the citizen has the duty to disclose all
material facts which will affect their financial situation
and entitlement to benefits and it is assumed that people
will actually do so and in general are constructed as law-
abiding citizens. Yet, in the case of single parents, they
have to submit a signed document stating that they are
indeed genuine singles to maintain the financial support.
The message here is that this group of citizens is prone
to committing fraud and has to be controlled. This is a
powerful construction of a social target group which not
only conveys a message of the perceived value of that
group but also strips them of their established rights and
separates them from the broader citizenry. Dismissing or
ignoring structural conditions, socio-economic realities
and how they influence marginalised people’s lives has
become a common strategy. Instead, the responsibility
is placed on the individual. There are no political gains
in challenging this message. The rather simplistic logic
prevailing is that people should support themselves and
contribute to the common good. As the statistics illus-
trate thatmost single parents arewomen the category of
genuine single becomes gendered. Freedom, self-choice,
and flexibility can, as Wacquant claims, be felt at the top
but the same choices are not available at the bottom of
society, where many single mothers are positioned and
targeted through punitive, paternalist, and authoritarian
policies and attitudes.
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